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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
In sum, military commission have jurisdiction to try those captured in

Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo as (1) a military commission in Guantanamo
Bay fits within the expanded notion of a theater of war; (2) an armed conflict existed in
Afghanistan, and the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan; (3) those captured
in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay do not qualify as prisoners of war; (4)
military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of war.
Thus, those captured in Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo Bay can be subject
to a military commission pursuant to The Order. A military commission has jurisdiction
to preside in Guantanamo Bay over those captured in Afghanistan as the President in
ordering those military commissions is acting within his war powers and in accordance
with Congress’ Joint Resolution 23. The President’s powers are at their highest when he
acts with the strength of his own powers and with the authorization of Congress.
Additionally, U.S. courts have also deferred to the President when he is acting within his
powers as commander in chief.
Acting at the peak of his powers, the President issued a Military Order (“The Order”)
with the strength of his own Executive powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Armed Forces and with the authorization of Congress’ Joint Resolution 23.
Through Joint Resolution 23, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force in the war against terrorism. The language of Joint Resolution 23
confers upon the President a very broad power to wage a global war on terrorism. Along
with his own powers as the Commander-in-Chief, the President’s decision to implement
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The Order and subsequently decision to use military commissions at Guantanamo Bay
are within the authority that Congress broadly conferred on the President and are within
his powers as Commander-in-Chief.
In trying those individuals subject to The Order, the Secretary of Defense is to
determine the time and place for military commissions to try those individuals.
Individuals subject to The Order include (1) al-Qaeda members; (2) persons who have
engaged, helped, conspired or taken acts in preparation for international terrorism against
the United States and (3) anyone knowingly harboring someone described in (1) or (2).
U.S. citizens are not subject to The Order. The Secretary of Defense has also determined
that the military commissions should take place at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
Although Congress’ constitutional power to wage war is the legal basis for
military commissions, the Executive Branch has historically established military
commissions. The President has the authority to convene military commissions to try
offenses against the laws of war. Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice grant military commissions the jurisdiction to try
individuals who violate the law of war. Military commissions can try persons for
violations of the laws of war. Military commissions, unlike courts-martial and Article III
courts, can be held at any geographic location. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized the power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over those charged with
violating the laws of war. U.S. Supreme Court opinions in Ex parte Quirin, Yamashita,
Eisentrager and Kinsella have recognized that military commissions are proper fora for
the trial of violations of the laws of war. These opinions are evidence that the President
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has the power to establish military commissions for the trail of violations of the laws of
war.
The theater of war for the global war against terrorism is much broader than just
Afghanistan. The President historically has been able to establish a military commission
in terms of the place in a ‘theater of war’ or a war-related occupied territory. The term of
‘theater of war’, although once formally defined, has evolved over time to meet the
changing nature of the less-defined, modern-day warfare tactics and global wars. As
wars have become more global, the jurisdictional requirement of ‘theater of war’ has
adapted to meet the expanding nature of our modern wars. Most notably, the global
nature of World War II caused the term ‘theater of war’ to lose much of its relevance in
determining the appropriate placement of military commissions. Courts have either
expanded the notion of the ‘theater of war’ requirement or have refused to define the
boundaries. The courts’ refusals to address the limitations of the ‘theater of war’
requirement displays that the term ‘theater of war’ is a term that must change and adapt to
meet the ever-expanding nature of modern, global warfare.
Just as World War II changed the previous, conceived notions of a theater of war,
the war against terrorism demands a further expansion of the ‘theater of war’
jurisdictional limitation. The war on terrorism is a modern, global war that fits into no
geographical boundaries, and the notion of a ‘theater of war’ must change and expand to
meet the current development and nature of present-day warfare, especially for the war
against terrorism. A military commission pursuant to The Order sitting in Guantanamo
Bay does fit within the expanding notion of ‘theater of war.’
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The military commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction over those captured
in Afghanistan because the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. A formal
declaration of war is not needed for the laws of war to apply, since the laws of war come
into play during any armed conflict. The laws of war apply only during times of war, and
a state of war may exist where only one party has made a declaration of war or where
neither party has made a formal declaration. The Supreme Court and Congress have
recognized that a state of war may exist without a formal declaration.
The United States was clearly at war, declared or undeclared, in Afghanistan,
when the United States’ use of military force upgraded the conflict between the Taliban
and the Northern Alliance to an international armed conflict. Thus, the military
commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction over those captured in Afghanistan and
brought to Guantanamo Bay because the laws of war apply to those captured in
Afghanistan.
Whether an individual captured in Afghanistan is considered a prisoner of war or
not determines if that individual is subject to the jurisdiction of a military commission.
Unlawful combatants are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and can be tried
and punished by U.S. military commissions. Unlawful combatants, as opposed to lawful
combatants, fail to qualify for the protections of being prisoners of war. In general,
lawful combatants are open, active participants in hostilities, as soldiers who wear the
uniform, move under a flag, and hold the appropriate commission from their government
and are entitled to all the courtesies due to soldiers. If the detainees are recognized as
prisoners of war, they would be immune from prosecutions for lawful acts of war. If the
detainees are considered prisoners of war, international law requires that the transfers be
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subject to transfers are subject to limitations imposed by two treaties to which the United
States is a party, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. Also, the Third Geneva Convention requires that a prisoner of
war be given essentially the same rights that a member of the armed forces of the party
trying him or her would receive under similar circumstances.
In other words, if a detainee is found to be a prisoner of war, then the procedures
required to try him would be those under which an equivalent U.S. serviceman or woman
would be tried. Thus, if the detainee was found to be a prisoner of war and tried before a
military commission, then a military commission must also try the United States’ own
solders as well. The United States can only implement military commissions to try
prisoners of war only when military commissions are also used to try its own military
personnel. Since U.S. military personnel are not currently tried before military
commissions, if those captured in Afghanistan are considered prisoners of war, the U.S.
could not use military commissions to try those detainees.
The United States has determined that the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention covering prisoners of war are not applicable to those members of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda captured in Afghanistan and then moved to Guantanamo Bay. Since those
captured in Afghanistan do not qualify as prisoners of war, the United States can use
military commissions to try those captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo
Bay.
Military commissions, according to the laws and customs of war, have
jurisdiction over any individuals guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offenses in
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violation of the laws of war. The Order authorizes military commissions to prosecute
individuals who have violated the laws of war and other applicable laws. Generally, the
laws of war consist of general principles of conduct that apply during times of armed
conflict and is not a formal written code. The Department of Defense defines the law of
war as that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice defines law of war as that branch of International Law
which prescribes the rights and obligations of belligerents which, in time of war, define
the status of enemies and which authorizes their trial and punishment when offenders. In
defining the law of war in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress was not
attempting to codify the law of war but rather was authorizing the punishment of
violations of laws of war. In general, the laws of war require a party to avoid needless
and disproportionate suffering and damages when pursuing a military objective. When
assessing the legality of any use of force for political objectives, three principles derived
from the laws of war – military necessity, humanity and chivalry – are applied to assess
the use of such force. Military commissions can try those individuals who violate the
laws of war in pursuing either a military or political objective.
In conclusion, military commission have jurisdiction to try those captured in
Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo as (1) a military commission in Guantanamo
Bay fits within the expanded notion of a theater of war; (2) an armed conflict existed in
Afghanistan, and the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan; (3) those captured
in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay do not qualify as prisoners of war; (4)
military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of war.
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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
President Bush issued a Military Order (“The Order”) on November 13, 2001

authorizing the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to detain indefinitely any
individual who is not a United States citizen and who is suspected to be a terrorist or a
terrorist sympathizer without constitutional due process of law.2 Acting pursuant to
congressional authority, the President has authority under The Order:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.3

2

Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule by Law: The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM.

J. CRIM. L. 225, 230 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1]
(citing Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Issues
Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (Nov. 13, 2001).
See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).)
3

Jennifer Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals

before Military Commissions, CRS Report for Congress received through the CRS Web,
Order Code RL31191, 27 available at fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7951.pdf
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 2] (citing P.L. 107-40.).
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The Order, “citing the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces,”4 states that the President can order that an individual be detained and
prosecuted “for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals.”5 The Order states that “individuals subject to this order” shall be tried by
military commissions.6 The Order “additionally provides for jurisdiction over persons

4

Diane F. Orentlicher and Robert Kogod Goldman, The Military Tribunal Order: When

Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 653, 654 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 3]
(citing Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism preamble, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001),
[hereinafter Military Order].).
5

6

Id., at 654 (citing Id., at 57,833-34, §§ 1(e), 2(b).).
Jennifer Trahan, Trying A Bin Laden and Others, Evaluating the Options for Terrorist

Trials, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L 475, 478 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1
at Tab 4] (citing Executive Order 1(e), 2, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833-34; see also Procedures
for Trials by Military Commission of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, 3(B)
(Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.news.findlaw.com/hdocs/dod/dod032102milcomord1.pdf
(providing that military commissions may try "violations of the laws of war and all other
offenses triable by military commission") [hereinafter Rules].)
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‘alleged to have committed an offense in a charge that has been referred to the
Commission by the Appointing Authority.’”7
III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

(A). THE ORDER
The Order states that it has authority because of “the U.S Constitution and laws of
the United States of America, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint
Resolution, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (‘Joint Resolution 23’), and sections
821 and 836 of title 10 of the U.S. Code.”8 The President is vested with all executive
power, including the substantial power of being the Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Armed Forces.9 Congress issued Joint Resolution 2310 in response to the terrorist
7

Id., at 479, n.7 (citing Rules, supra note 6, 3(A)(2). This language presumably does not

expand the jurisdiction of the commissions since "[in] the event of any inconsistency
between the President's Military Order and [the Rules] ... the provisions of the President's
Military Order shall govern." Id. 7(B).).
8

Id., at 478, n.5 (citing Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833.)

9

Mitchell Lathrop, A Realistic Look at Terrorism Trials by Military Commission,

(November 2001), 2 available at www.911investigations.net/document752.html
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 5] (citing U.S. Constitution, Article
II, sections 1 and 2).
10

Joshua S. Clover, “Remember, We’re The Good Guys”: The Classification and Trial of

the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 353 (2004) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 6] (citing Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter JR 23].).

9

attacks of September 11, 2001.11 By issuing Joint Resolution 23, Congress authorized the
President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.12
III(A)(1). THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO DETAIN THE GUANTANAMO BAY
DETAINEES.

The President in accordance with The Order is able to detain the Guantanamo Bay
detainees. He is able to detain them because of several sources – the President’s
Constitutional powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Congress’
authorization through Congress’ Joint Resolution 23, and two sections (§§ 821 and 836)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.13 Congress’ Joint Resolution 23 has expanded
further the President’s inherent constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. The
language of Joint Resolution 23 confers upon the President a “very broad power to wage
a global war on terrorism.”14 The language of “appropriate force” does provide that
Congress must deem the President’s actions appropriate.15 The rest of Joint Resolution
11

Id.

12

Authorization for the Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224

(2001), § 2(a) [hereinafter JR 23]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab
7].
13

Clover, supra note 9, at 383.

14

Id.

15

Id.

10

23’s broad language seems to indicate that the President can use all necessary force
against any individual or party that the President determines are involved in terrorism.16
Thus, through the broad language of Joint Resolution 23, Congress has authorized the
President to use all necessary force. Moreover, Congress’ Joint Resolution 23 authorizes
the President to use the necessary force to detain those removed from Afghanistan at
Guantanamo Bay.
Additionally, court opinions further bolster the President’s authority to remove
those captured from Afghanistan and detain them at Guantanamo Bay. In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,17 the court relied on the broad language in Joint Resolution 23 “in determining
the power of the President to detain an American citizen captured during combat
operations in Afghanistan.”18 The Hamdi court stated that the language of Joint
Resolution 23 "necessarily includes the capture and detention of any and all hostile forces
arrayed against our troops."19

16

Id.

17

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).

[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 8].
18

Clover, supra note 9, at 383, n.230 (citing 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). This case

involves the detention of Yaser Esam Hamdi. Hamdi who was captured in Afghanistan
by Northern Alliance forces and then turned over to United States forces. Id. While in the
custody of the United States military, he was eventually transferred to the detention
facility at Camp X-Ray aboard the Naval Base, Guantanomo Bay, Cuba. Id.).
19

Id., at 383 (citing 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4th Cir. 2003).)

11

The President’s powers are at their highest when he acts with the strength of his
own powers and with the authorization of Congress.20 When considering Congress’ Joint
Resolution 23 coupled with the President’s Article I, Section 8 Commander-in-Chief
powers, the “[p]resident's issuance of the Detention Order fits squarely in Justice
Jackson's first category of Presidential power in which the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied Congressional Authorization.”21 According to Justice Jackson’s
famous opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,22 when the President acts in
accordance with his Constitutional powers as the Executive branch and with a
Congressional formal declaration, the President is acting at the apex of his presidential
authority.23 The President’s Order is backed by both his Executive powers as

20

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-660 (1952) (Jackson,

J. concurring). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 9].
21

Clover, supra note 9, at 384 (citing See supra text accompanying notes 211-212.)

22

343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).

23

See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military

Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 755 (2002)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 10] (noting “[w]ith a formal
declaration, a President acts with express and clear congressional authorization, the apex
of Justice Jackson's sliding scale of presidential authority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.” Id., n.672 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it

12

Commander-in-Chief and Congress’ formal declaration in Joint Resolution 23 to use all
appropriate force in the war against terrorism. Thus, in issuing The Order, the President
is acting at the apex of his presidential authority.
The language of the Hamdi opinion shows that the Fourth Circuit “felt that the
use of military commissions provided for in (The Order) were within the authority that
Congress conferred on the President when it authorized him to ‘use all necessary and
appropriate force’ in prosecuting a war on terrorism.”24 The Hamdi opinion also
“reiterates much of the analysis” from the Dames & Moore opinion,25 “not[ing] that that
the President's war powers encompass not only his ability to wage war, but also his
decisions to detain enemies during hostilities.”26 The opinion also notes that “the courts
have traditionally shown ‘great deference to the political branches when called upon to
decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military
affairs.’”27 Thus, the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers combined with Congress’
Joint Resolution 23 language and a judicial deference to the executive and legislative
branches for matters related to national security and war authorize the President to detain
and try the Guantanamo detainees in accordance with The Order.28

includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.")
(emphasis added).).
24

Clover, supra note 9, at 384 (citing See supra text accompanying notes 227-234.).

25

Id., at 384.

26

Id., at 384-385 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003).).

27

Hamdi, supra note 16, 316 F.3d at 463 (citing Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281.).

28

Clover, supra note 9, at 388.
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III(A)(2). THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHALL DETERMINE “AN APPROPRIATE
LOCATION OUTSIDE OR INSIDE THE UNITED STATES” TO DETAIN THOSE INDIVIDUALS
SUBJECT TO THE ORDER.

Section 3 of the Order states that the Secretary of Defense shall determine “an
appropriate location … outside or inside the United States” to detain any individual
subject to The Order.29 As long as the individual is subject to The Order, the Secretary of
Defense has the lone power to decide where to detain that individual. The location as
stated must only be an ‘appropriate location’ and can be ‘outside or inside the United
States.’ Thus, the Secretary in accord with the powers supporting The Order can detain
any individual subject to the order in any location the Secretary deems appropriate.
Section 4 of the Order further supports that the Guantanamo detainees removed
from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay are subject to The Order’s jurisdiction through
military commissions. Section 4(c)(1) empowers the Secretary of Defense to determine
that “military commissions [are] to sit at any time and any place.”30 The Order gives the
Secretary broad discretion to determine where to detain any individual subject to The
Order. The Order also authorizes the Secretary to have broad discretion in determining
when the military commission is to take place. Inherent within these sections is the

29

Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War

Against Terrorism Section 3(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), [hereinafter The
Order]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 11].
30

The Order, supra note 28, Section 4(c)(1). Section 4(c)(1) provides that “military

commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent with such guidance regarding
time and place as the Secretary of Defense may provide.” Id.
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possibility that the Secretary of Defense will determine that those captured on the
battlefield will be transported to a place inside or outside of the United States for
detention. Also, inherent within this section of The Order is that those subject to The
Order who are captured on a battlefield will be transported to face a military commission
convened in a different location from the battlefield. Thus, military commissions created
in accord with The Order still maintain jurisdiction over those captured in Afghanistan
and removed to Guantanamo Bay for trial, as long as those individuals are subject to The
Order. Thus, before the Secretary can determine the proper place to detain the individual,
the individual must be subject to The Order.
III(A)(3). THE PRESIDENT CAN DETAIN ANY PERSON SUBJECT TO THE ORDER.

Pursuant to Section 2(a) of The Order, the President “from time to time in
writing” can determine that “any individual who is not a United States citizen” can be
subject to The Order:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al-Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or
have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs
(i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this
order.31
Thus, The Order gives broad jurisdiction over (1) al-Qaeda members [Section 2(a)(1)(i)],
(2) persons who have engaged, helped, conspired or taken acts in preparation for
international terrorism against the United States [Section 2(a)(1)(ii)], and (3) anyone
31

Trahan, supra note 5, at 478-479 (citing Executive Order 2, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,834.)
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knowingly harboring someone described in (1) or (2) [Section 2(a)(1)(i) or Section
2(a)(1)(ii)].32 Additionally, the individual must be a non-citizen for the individual to be
subject to a military commission under The Order.33 Moreover, the individuals subject to
The Order is “a much broader group of people than those who have committed war
crimes.”34
III(B).

MILITARY COMMISSIONS

III(B)(1). HISTORY SHOWS THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ESTABLISHES MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AND ITS JURISDICTION.
Although Congress’ constitutional power to wage war is the legal basis for
military commissions, the Executive Branch has historically established military
commissions.35 “Military commissions derive their authority from Articles I and II of the

32

Id., at 479.

33

Wayne McCormack, Military Detention and the Judiciary: Al Qaeda, the KKK and

Supra-State Law, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 12].
34

Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law

Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, 2002 ARMY LAW. 8, 13 (2002).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 13].
35

Daryl A. Mundis, Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of Military Commissions to

Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 A.J.I.L. 320, 321 (2002)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 14] (citing William Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents (2d rev. ed. 1920). For detailed analysis of military
commissions during the nineteenth century, see id. at 831-46.).
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U.S. Constitution.”36 Congress is empowered by the Constitution “to define and punish
violations of international law37 as well as to establish courts with exclusive jurisdiction
over military offenses.”38 Military commissions can be legally created to try “offenders
or offenses designated by statute or law of war.”39 The President by Article II of the U.S.
Constitution has the “executive power”40 and is the “Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy.”41 Additionally, the President’s power to authorize military commissions
arises from “his responsibility to execute the laws of the nation.”42 “Under the former
Articles of War and subsequent” Uniform Code of Military Justice,43 “the President has
authority to convene military commissions to try offenses against the law of war.”44
36

Lathrop, supra note 8, p. 2.

37

Jennifer Elsea, Trying Terrorists as War Criminals, CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS21056, 3 available at
www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/6270.pdf (Updated October 29, 2001) [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 15] (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.).
38

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.).

39

Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 821.). “Statutory offenses for which a military commission may

be convened include only aiding the enemy, 10 U.S.C. § 904, and spying, 10 U.S.C. §
906.” Id. at 3, n.10.
40

Lathrop, supra note 8, 2 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.).

41

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.).

42

Elsea, supra note 2, 17 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II.).

43

Elsea, supra note 36, 3. “The Articles of War were codified as 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

as part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).” Id., 3, n.11. Cases discussing
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“In U.S. law and practice, military commissions, courts, and tribunals have four
distinct types of jurisdiction” – martial law, law of war, military justice and military
government.45 Particularly, “[m]ilitary commissions can be designed for several

military commissions before the UCMJ interpret the Articles of War, but “the relevant
sections of the UCMJ would likely be interpreted to be essentially identical.” Id. (citing
See Robinson, O. Everett, & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses Against
the Laws of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 515 (1994).). See Also Brian W.
Earley, The War on Terrorism and The Enemy Within: Using Military Commissions to
Prosecute U.S. Citizens for Terrorist-Related Violations of the Laws of War, 30 N.E. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 75,

84-85 (2004) (noting that “[p]ursuant to its Constitutional duty

‘to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,’
Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950, which revised
and replaced its predecessor - the Articles of War. The articles of the UCMJ, like those
of the Articles of War, ‘are statutory provisions for the enforcement of discipline and for
the administration of criminal justice within the U.S. armed forces.’ By enacting the
UCMJ, Congress prescribed the jurisdictional limits of our military justice system.) Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 14; Madsen, 343 U.S. at 351 n.17.; Winthrop, supra note
44 at 17; 10 U.S.C. 802 (2000).).
44

Elsea, supra note 36, 3 (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).).

45

Orentlicher, supra note 3, 655; See Also 30 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 75, 85-86

(noting that “scholars in the military justice field recognize that the military can exercise
four types of jurisdiction:
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purposes: (1) to prosecute violations of the law of war, as an alternative to courts-martial;
(2) to fill a legal vacuum where armed conflict disables the civil courts; and (3) to impose
swift and certain punishment against civilians suspected of specific crimes.”46 “Articles I
and II of the U.S. Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice grant military
commissions the jurisdiction to try individuals who violate the law of war.”47 Military

(1) "military justice' jurisdiction ... over members of the military (for example,
court-martial proceedings); (2) "military government' jurisdiction ... [which
authorizes] the military to set up courts when the United States occupies a foreign
country after a war and there is no longer a rule of law or domestic court system
operating ... (for example, Germany after World War II); (3) "marital law'
jurisdiction [where] the President [can] order the military to exercise the
responsibilities of ... the courts if [they] are unable to function because of war,
insurrection, or other disaster, and; (4) "law of war' jurisdiction ... over those who
do not abide by the internationally accepted rules of war ... . Id, at 85 (citing
Mudd, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 141.).
In addition, it has been consistently recognized that:
military jurisdiction is of two kinds: first, that which is conferred and defined by
statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war ... military
offenses under the statute-law must be tried in the manner therein directed; but
military offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished
under the common law of war ... in the [armed forces] of the United States the
first is exercised by courts-martial; while cases which do not come within the
[Uniform Code of Military Justice], or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on
courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.” Id., at 85-86 (citing 14 Op.
Att'y. Gen. 250 (1873).).
46

Joan Fitzpatrick, Agora: Military Commissions: Jurisdiction of Military Commissions

and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 A.J.I.L 345, 345 (2002). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 16].
47

Melvin Heard, Lt. Robert P. Monahan, William Ryan, and E. Page Wilkins, Military

Commissions: A Legal and Appropriate Means of Trying Suspected Terrorists?, 49
NAVAL L. REV 71, 73 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 17]
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commissions have “subject-matter jurisdiction only over war crimes and war-related
offenses”48 and thus can “try persons not otherwise subject to military law for violations
of the law of war and for offenses committed in territory under military occupation.”49
Military commissions, thus, are narrowly focused, which differentiates them from
“the general criminal jurisdiction of courts-martial50 and U.S. District Courts.”51
Additionally, the forums differ in where they are able to convene. Article I courts-martial

(citing See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
“Note: In 1950, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Article 21 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice is derived from Article 15 of the Articles of War which
is discussed in Quirin and Yamashita.)” Id.
48

Frederic L. Borch III, Why Military Commissions are the Proper Forum and Why

Terrorists will have “Full and Fair” Trials: A Rebuttal to Military Commissions: Trying
American Justice, 2003 ARMY LAW. 10, 11 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 18] (citing Id.; MCO No. 1, supra note 9.)).
49

Lathrop, supra note 8, 3 (citing See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. at 346-47; W.

Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 2d ed. 1920 reprint, 831-846).
50

“Article 18, UCMJ, provides that, in addition to jurisdiction over persons subject to

military law, primarily the members of the armed forces, ‘General courts-martial also
have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war.’ Presumably, the
President has chosen to use military commissions because the procedures can more easily
be tailored to meet the exigencies of the circumstances.” Evans, supra note 33, 9, n.8.
51

Borch, supra note 47, 11 (citing Id.; MCO No. 1, supra note 9.)
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“may be tied to a command’s location,”52 Article III courts “must be held in the United
States,”53 and “military commissions may be held at any geographic location.”54
During World War II, the Supreme Court upheld the use of military
commissions.55 In Ex Parte Quirin,56 the Supreme “Court upheld the jurisdiction of a

52

Id., at 12. “Note, however, that ‘courts-martial have power to try any offense under the

code except when prohibited by the Constitution.’” Id. (citing MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. II-15 (2002)). Additionally, “‘the authority
to convene courts-martial is independent of rank and is retained as long as the convening
authority remains a commander in one of the designated positions.’” Id. (citing Id. pt. II48.).
53

Id., at 12.

54

Id. (citing See U.S. CONST. art. III; MCO No. 1, supra note 9.). “Procedural rules and

evidentiary rules are prescribed by the President and may differ among commissions.”
Elsea, supra note 36, 4 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836. “The President may prescribe rules:
(a) Pretrial, trial and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases
arising under this chapter [10 USCS §§ 908 et seq.] triable in courts-martial,
military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as
he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter [10
USCS §§ 801 et seq.]
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as
practicable.”).
55

See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1

at Tab 19]; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 1 at Tab 20]. See Elsea, supra note 2, 23 (citing Maj. Jan E. Aldykiewicz,
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military commission ordered by President Roosevelt.”57 In In re Yamashita,58 the U.S.
Supreme “Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military commission to try Japanese General
Yamashita for war crimes,”59 and “declined to examine the procedural rules applied by
the military commission.”60 Additionally, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,61 “the Supreme
Court affirmed the convictions of German citizens who had been convicted by U.S.
military commissions set up in China.”62 Further, the Supreme Court in Madsen v.

Authority to Court Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed during Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL.
L. REV. 74, 75-76 (2001) (“noting that the United States Army judge advocate prosecuted
some 1,600 German war crimes defendants of crimes committed against American
troops, or in Nazi concentration camps that had been overrun and ‘liberated’ by American
forces. French and British tribunals tried about an equal amount.”).
56

Quirin, supra note 54, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

57

Lathrop, supra note 8, 3 (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).).

58

supra note 54, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).

59

Lathrop, supra note 8, 4 (citing Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).).

60

Elsea, supra note 36, 24.

61

339 U.S. 763 (1950). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].

62

Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, CRS

Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RL31367, 44 available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31367.pdf (Updated September 17, 2003) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 22]; Eisentrager, supra note 60, 339 U.S. 763
(1950).
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Kinsella63 “upheld the jurisdiction of a military commission to try a civilian U.S.
citizen.”64 “The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the ‘power of the military to
exercise jurisdiction over . . . enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with
violating the laws of war.’”65 Thus, through its opinions in Ex parte Quirin and
Application of Yamashita (and including Eisentrager and Kinsella), the Supreme Court,
“has recognized that military commissions are proper fora for the trial of violations of the
law of war.”66 The Supreme Court even acknowledged that “[m]ilitary commissions are
‘an important incident to the conduct of war’ whereby a military commander can ‘subject
to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war.’”67 These opinions are evidence that the
63

343 U.S. 341 (1952). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 23].

64

Lathrop, supra note 8, 3.

65

Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over Foreign

Nationals who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1996) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 24] (citing Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304, 312 (1945).).
66

Evans, supra note 33, 11.

67

Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief

Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts,
2002 Army Law. 19, 40 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 25]
(citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11(1946).);
See Also 30 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 75, 85 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has
‘characterized as ‘well-established’ the ‘power of the military to exercise jurisdiction
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President has the power to establish military commissions for the trial of violations of the
laws of war. Additionally, these opinion are evidence that military commissions, as
opposed to courts-martial or the courts of the U.S. judicial system, are the proper venue
to try those violating the laws of war.
III(B)(2). THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ‘THEATER OF WAR’ HAS LOST ITS
HISTORICAL RELEVANCE, BECAUSE THE NOTION OF A ‘THEATER OF WAR’ HAS CHANGED
AND EXPANDED TO MEET THE MODERN DEVELOPMENTS OF GLOBAL WARS.

The President historically has been able to establish a military commission “in
terms of the place for its direct functioning to a theater of war or a war related occupied
territory.”68 Jurisdictional limitations of military commissions started to take place

over members of the armed forces, those directly connected with such forces, or enemy
[combatants], prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of war,’ and has
held that ‘the Military Commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against
the laws of war.’ Military commissions do not have a statutory existence, although they
are recognized by statutory law. Id. (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786
(1949) (emphasis added); Madsen, 343 U.S. at 353; see also 10 U.S.C. 821 (2000).).
68

Jordan J. Paust, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal

Regime after September 11?: Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies regarding War and
Defense, Guantanamo, The Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention
and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1363 (2004)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 26] (citing See The Grapeshot, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) at 132-33 (identifying war related occupied territory as "wherever the
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during the Mexican American War.69 “[T]he trial itself had to be conducted within a
theater of war.”70 “From the earliest moments of U.S. history to World War II, the
United States has applied customary international law to define the jurisdiction of
military commissions.”71 Understandably so, the term ‘theater of war’ has organically
evolved from its more formalized definition in the Mexican American War to meet the
development of the less-defined, modern-day warfare tactics and global wars. “[T]he

insurgent power was overthrown"); William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 836
(2d ed. 1920):
A military commission ... can legally assume jurisdiction only of offences
committed within the field of command of the convening commander. ...
[Regarding military occupation, a commission] "cannot take cognizance of an
offence committed without such territory. ... The place must be the theatre of war
or a place where military government or martial law may be legally exercised;
otherwise a military commission ... will have no jurisdiction.
Id.; Paust, supra note 41, at 5 & n.14, 25 n.70, 26-27; see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (discussing tribunals in "occupied enemy territory"); id. at 326
(Murphy, J., concurring) (noting that martial law is limited to cases where "a foreign
invasion or civil war actually closes the courts"); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509,
515 (1878) ("when ... in the enemy's country"); id. at 517 (when in occupation of enemy
territory).).
69

MacDonnell, supra note 66, 28 (citing n119 WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 837.). See

2002 ARMY LAW. 19 (discussing the difference between courts-martial and military
commissions and outlining the history of U.S. military commissions.).).
70

Id. (citing n121 WINTHROP, supra note 9, at 836.).

71

Id., at 30.
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expansion of ‘the theater of operations’ illustrates that American military commission
jurisdiction, and thus the jurisdictional limitations imposed by customary international
law, have evolved over time with the changing nature of warfare.”72
As wars have become more global, the jurisdictional requirement of ‘theater of
war’ has adapted to meet the expanding nature of our modern wars. In United States ex
rel. Wessels v. McDonald,73 “[t]he court ruled that Milligan's emphasis on a theater of
war had to be modernized,”74 and “that the military could try a German citizen accused
for espionage in New York during World War I.”75 The court noted that “[w]ith the
progress made in obtaining ways and means of devastation and destruction, the territory
of the United States was certainly within the field of active operations.”76 Because of
“the global nature of World War II,” the term “‘theater of war’ lost much of its
relevance” in determining the appropriate placement of military commissions.77 Thus,
the term ‘theater of war’ adapted to meet the conditions of World War II by coming more
broad and losing much of its formalized boundaries.78

72

Id.

73

265 F. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1920). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 27].

74

Turley, supra note 22, 752, n.659 (citing McDonald, 265 F. at 763-64.). (emphasis

added).
75

Id. (citing McDonald, 265 F. at 763-64.).

76

Id. (citing McDonald, 265 F. at 763-64.).

77

MacDonnell, supra note 66, 29.

78

Id.
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Courts have either expanded the notion of the ‘theater of war’ requirement79 or
have refused to define the boundaries.80 The courts’ refusals to address the limitations of
the ‘theater of war’ requirement displays that the term ‘theater of war’ is a term that must
change and adapt to meet the ever-expanding nature of modern, global warfare. The war
on terrorism – against Al Qaeda, specifically – is a modern, global war that fits into no
geographical boundaries. In Quirin, the Court by stating “the petitioners … were plainly
within those boundaries”81 declined to address, even in dictum, any jurisdictional
limitation the term ‘theater of war’ may have on a global war. The Court by not
divulging into the issue, even through dictum, did not limit itself to address the meaning
of a military commission’s ‘theater of war’ jurisdiction and its expanding definition
during a global war. Thus, a military commission pursuant to The Order sitting in
Guantanamo Bay does fit within the expanding notion of ‘theater of war.
The Order allows for the establishment of military commissions in the United
States’ global war on terrorism. The war on terrorism is a war against enemies that do
not recognize other countries’ borders and furthermore do not call any border home. The
nature of terrorists and the subsequent war against terrorism is unable to be fought within
formalized borders, such as the previous wars of the United States. Thus, the war against
terrorism is a global war without formally recognized borders. Further, the notion of a
theater of war must expand to meet the current development and nature of present-day

79

Turley, supra note 22, 752, n.659.

80

Id., at 753, n.660.

81

Id.
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warfare, especially for the war against terrorism. Thus, a military commission pursuant
to The Order’s war against terrorism has an expanding notion of the theater of war.
Although there is a claim that allowing military commissions sitting in Guantanamo
Bay “flies in the face of the Court’s prior efforts to limit military authority to the ‘locality
of actual war’ and to reject the application of martial law ‘where the courts are open.’”82
This argument fails because since the conception of military commissions, the courts
have expanded the notion of ‘theater of war’ to adapt to the nature of modern wars. “The
cases involving the President’s war power are few in number, and are all but silent in
construing the limits or contours of those powers.”83 Just as World War II changed the
previous, conceived notions of ‘theater of war’, the war on terrorism demands a further
expansion of the ‘theater of war’ jurisdictional limitation. Analyzing the case law since
World War II, “[t]he Court has refused to speak about the powers of the President as
commander in chief in any but the most guarded terms.”84 Furthermore, the Court “has
never embarked on one of those expansive flights of dicta into which it has been so often
tempted by other great constitutional questions.”85 The Supreme Court has “fixed neither
the outer boundaries nor the inner divisions of the President’s martial authority, and has

82

83

Id., at 753 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).).
The Committee on Federal Courts, The Indefinite Detention of “Enemy Combatants”:

Balancing Due Process and National Security in the Context of the War on Terror, 59
The Record 41, 115 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 28].
84

Id. (citing Rossiter at 4-5).

85

Id. (citing Rossiter at 4-5).
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failed to completely draw the line between his powers and those of Congress.”86
Additionally, the courts, in times of war, have “recognized the futility of any judicial
restraint on the President’s freedom of action in prosecuting the war.”87 During times of
war, U.S. courts have given deference to the President’s actions when he is acting within
the scope of his war powers.
III(B)(3). MILITARY COMMISSIONS DO NOT REQUIRE A FORMAL DECLARATION OF
WAR.

The military commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction over those captured in
Afghanistan because the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. A military
commission in Guantanamo Bay can try violations against the laws of war because (1)
Congress’ Joint Resolution 23 is a formal declaration of war against terrorism, and the
President has clear and broad use of his Executive powers as Commander-in-Chief; (2)
even if Joint Resolution is not considered a formal declaration of war, military
commissions have been used, and upheld by both Congress and the Supreme Court, in
previous hostilities where there was no formal declaration of war because the threat
required immediate action, and that immediate action could only come from the
Executive Branch’s acting as the Commander-in-Chief; (3) the conflict in Afghanistan
has been recognized as an international state of armed conflict and the laws of war apply
to such conflicts. Thus, the military commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction
over those captured in Afghanistan and brought to Guantanamo Bay because the laws of
war apply to those captured in Afghanistan.
86

Id. (citing Rossiter at 4-5).

87

Id., at 116 (citing Rossiter at 4-5).
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A formal declaration of war is not needed for the laws of war to apply, since
“[t]he laws of war come into play during any ‘armed conflict.’”88 The laws of war “only
apply during times of war,”89 and “a state of war may exist where only one party has
made a declaration of war or where neither party has made such a declaration.”90 Thus,
the laws of war apply to any armed conflict, formally declared or undeclared.
A formal declaration of war “offers the clearest authority for the broadest use of
powers”91 and “defines who the enemy is: another state, and all the nationals of that
state.”92 Congress’ Joint Resolution 23, although different than the formal declarations of
war against Japan or Nazi Germany during World War II, defines the enemy as terrorists.
Congress’ Joint Resolution 23 is an appropriation by Congress for the President to take
any necessary and appropriate measures to utilize his Article II and Commander-in-Chief
powers to protect the United States in the war against terrorism. Thus, if Congress’ Joint
Resolution 23 is a formal declaration of war against terrorism, the President is at the apex
88

Brian W. Earley, The War on Terrorism and the Enemy Within: Using Military

Commissions to Prosecute U.S. Citizens for Terrorist-Related Violations of the Laws of
War, 30 N.E.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 75, 91 (2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 29]. (citing Elsea, supra note 97 at 10.).
89

Id., at 91.

90

Ruth Wedgwood, Agora: Military Commissions: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military

Commissions, 96 A.J.I.L. 328, 335 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2
at Tab 30] (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668.).
91

Lathrop, supra note 8, 5.
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Id.
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of his Executive powers, and his implementing The Order would fall within the ‘broadest
use of his powers.’
Even assuming arguendo that Joint Resolution 23 does not rise to the level of a
Congressional declaration of war, “[t]he Supreme Court and Congress have recognized
that a state of war may exist without a formal declaration.”93 Notably, the Quirin court
“reserve[ed] the question of the President's unilateral power,”94 and “declined to define

93

Id. (See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (1863); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). In Talbot v.

Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801), Chief Justice Marshall, for the Court, wrote, “It is not denied,
nor in the course of the argument has it been denied, that congress may authorize general
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial
hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they apply to our situation, must be
noticed.” Id., 5, n.10 (citing Talbot, at 28). Noting further that “Marshall provided no
clear answer, but the opinion did recognize that their application need not be explicit in
Congress’ authorizing act.” Id. See also “Congress’ declaration in the Mexican War,
where Congress did not ‘declare war.’” “Rather, it recognized that ‘by the act of the
Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between the government and the United
States.’” Id. (citing Winthrop, supra note 2, at 668).).
94

Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the

Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1281-1282 (2002) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 31] (citing Id. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present
purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional
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the jurisdictional limits of military commissions to try persons according to the law of
war.”95 Further, “military commissions, or similar military tribunals, have been used in
hostilities in which there was no declaration of war, including the Civil War and the
Indian Wars,”96 because “sometimes the exigencies of the threat may require immediate
action without waiting for Congress.”97 Even if Joint Resolution 23 does not rise to the
level of a formal declaration of war, the war against terrorism could rise to the level of a
threat requiring immediate action by the President. Furthermore, “[b]oth Congress and
the Supreme Court have recognized, however, that a formal declaration of war is not
necessary for a state of war to exist.”98 Even the 1949 Geneva Conventions recognizes
legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war
before such commissions.").
95

Lugosi, supra note 1, 251 (citing See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 at 45-46.)

96

Lathrop, supra note 8, 5 (citing See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346; Winthrop,

supra note 2 at 831-835. “However, in the Civil War, Congress specifically authorized
the use of military commissions in several acts.” Lathrop 5, note 11 (citing See
Winthrop, at 833).).
97

Katyal, supra note 93, 1272.

98

Amanda Schaffer, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of

the Government’s Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorist as
Enemy Combatants and Try those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab
32] (citing (n.116) Id. at 11; see infra text accompanying notes 117-121.). “The
government has argued that ‘whether a state of armed conflict exists to which the laws of
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that a formal declaration of war is not needed, as the “law of war applies in any
international ‘state of armed conflict.’”99 Additionally, international humanitarian law
does not require that that hostile parties be sovereign nations for a state of war to exist.100
In application to those removed from Afghanistan, the United States was clearly at
war, declared or undeclared, in Afghanistan, when the United States’ use of military force
upgraded the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to an international

war apply is a political question for the President, not the courts to decide.’ Id. (citing
Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445) (referring to the holding in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635
(1862).).
99

Wedgwood, supra note 89, 335; See 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (noting that “the

applicability of the laws of war no longer requires a formal declaration of war” suggesting that Quirin's application might not be limited to these circumstances. (citing
See Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 2; See Also Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff, Introduction, in Documents on the Laws of War 2 (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff eds., 2000) ("The application of the laws of war does not depend upon the
recognition of the existence of a formal state of “‘war,’ but (with certain qualifications)
comprehends situations of armed conflict whether or not formally declared or otherwise
recognized as ‘war.’”).
100

Id. (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666.).
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armed conflict.101 Even assuming arguendo that Joint Resolution 23 is not a formal
declaration of war against terrorism, a state of war can exist without a formal
Congressional declaration of war. Additionally, the laws of war apply to such states of
war, both declared and undeclared, and to any international state of armed conflict. More
importantly, since the laws of war apply to both declared and undeclared states of war, an
individual can subsequently be held accountable to the laws of war whether the war was
formally declared or not.
III(B)(4). THOSE CAPTURED IN AFGHANISTAN ARE NOT PRISONERS OF WAR, AND
MILITARY COMMISSIONS HAVE JURISDICTIONS OVER THOSE INDIVIDUALS.

In determining whether any individual captured in Afghanistan and detained in
Guantanamo Bay is subject to the jurisdiction of a military commission, “it is the status
of the enemy combatant, (i.e. whether lawful or unlawful), and the nature of the offense,
(i.e. whether cognizable or not by military commission) which, under the laws and
customs of war, authorizes a military commission to exercise jurisdiction over an
individual.”102 Implicit within the principles of the laws of war is a distinction drawn
between lawful and unlawful combatants.103 Several international conventions codify the
difference between lawful and unlawful combatants.104 In general, “[l]awful combatants
101

Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J.

INT’L L. 1, 5 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 33].
102

Earley, supra note 87, 91.

103

Earley, supra note 87, 89 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31.).

104

Katyal, supra note 93, 1263 (citing See Protocol Additional to the Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
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are ‘open, active participants in hostilities, as soldiers who wear the uniform, move under
a flag, and hold the appropriate commission from their government ... [and] are entitled to
all belligerent rights, and should receive all the courtesies due to soldiers.’”105 The
Quirin Court held that “‘unlawful belligerents’” are “not entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war” and “can be tried and punished by military commission.”106 “Unlawful

International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, arts. 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 23-24
[hereinafter Protocol I to the Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 3320-22,
75 U.N.T.S. 134, 138-42; Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, done Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295-96. Like many
legal rules, the distinction is not always clear. For example, Justice Black, joined by
Justices Douglas and Burton, disagreed with the majority over what constituted unlawful
belligerency in the Eisentrager case. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 793 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("Whether obedience to commands of their Japanese superiors
would in itself constitute "unlawful' belligerency in violation of the laws of war is not so
simple a question as the Court assumes.").
105

Earley, supra note 87, 89 (citing 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 302 (1865).).

106

Schaffer, supra note 97, 1466, n.10; See 30 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON. 75, 95

(citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 36, 48) (noting that the Quirin “Court held that since the
saboteurs were charged with the offense of “unlawful belligerency,” that is, being
unlawful enemy combatants, which was a violation of the laws of war and cognizable
before a military commission, the President was authorized to order that they be tried
before a military commission.).
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combatants are combatants who fail to qualify as prisoners of war.”107 “Thus, by
definition, unlawful combatants are not protected persons under the Prisoner of War
Convention.”108
If the detainees are recognized as prisoners of war, they would be immune from
prosecutions for lawful acts of war.109 If the detainees are considered prisoners of war,
international law requires that the transfers “are subject to limitations imposed by two
treaties to which the United States is a party, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War110 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
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Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.

1025, 1030 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 34].
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Id.
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James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International Law, 67

ALB. L. REV. 335, 349 (2003) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 35].
(citing See Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch's
Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 49, 5859 (1993) (noting that prisoner of war status offers a captive “immunity from criminal
prosecution under the domestic laws of his captor for his hostile acts which do not violate
the laws and customs of war”).
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John Yoo, Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal Regime

After September 11?: Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1223
(2004) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 36] (citing GPW, supra note
167.).

36

Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”111 Additionally, another consequence
to the significance of being a recognized by the Geneva Convention as a prisoner of war
is that a prisoner of war “may only be tried according to the rules laid out in the Third
Geneva Convention, which provide for basic due process.”112 The Third Geneva
Convention requires that a prisoner of war “be given essentially the same rights that as a
member of the armed forces of the party trying him or her would receive under similar
circumstances:
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been
pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the
provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.113

111

Id. (citing Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Torture Convention].). See 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1183 (noting that the
President is constitutionally authorized to engage in military transfers within certain
bounds.).).
112

Kenneth Anderson, The Military Tribunal Order: What to do with Bin Laden and Al

Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States
Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591,
616 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 37].
113

Id. (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75

U.N.T.S. at 212.).
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If a detainee is found to be a prisoner of war, “then the procedures required to try him
would be those under which an equivalent U.S. serviceman or woman would be tried.”114
Thus, if the detainee was found to be a prisoner of war and tried before a military
commission, then a military commission must also try the United States’ own solders as
well.115 Furthermore, according to Articles 84, 85, and 102 of the Third Geneva
Convention, the United States can implement military commissions to try prisoners of
war only when military commissions are also used to try its own military personnel.116
Since U.S. military personnel are not currently tried before military commissions, the
United States could not implement them to try prisoners of war.117 Thus, if the
individuals captured in Afghanistan qualify as prisoners of war, the United States, since it
does not use military commissions try its own military personnel, could not use military
commissions to try those qualifying as prisoners of war. Conversely, if those captured in
Afghanistan are not characterized as prisoners of war, the United States would be able to
try those individuals by military commissions.
“The United States initially characterized these individuals as unlawful enemy
combatants that did not fit into traditional prisoner-of-war categories.”118 In other words,
“[i]nitially, the Administration classified both groups of detainees [Taliban and Al
114

Id.

115

MacDonnell, supra note 66, 32.

116

Id., at 31.
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Id.
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Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST.

L.J. 939, 944 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 38].
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Qaeda] as ‘unlawful combatants’ who were not entitled to the protections listed in the
Third Geneva Convention, yet were still afforded humane treatment.”119 “Later, the
United States changed its view, allowing that the Geneva Convention covered Taliban
members, but not Al Qaeda”120 but “claimed that under that convention's provisions, the
Taliban were not POWs.”121 Since those members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda captured
119

Akash R. Desai, How We Should Think About the Constitutional Status of the

Suspected Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Examining Theories that Interpret the
Constitution’s Scope, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1579, 1587 (2003) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 39] (citing Murphy, supra note 3, at 476-77.). “With
respect to the Taliban, some members in the U.S. government argued that Afghanistan
ceased to be a party to the Third Geneva Convention since it was not a functioning state
during the allied campaign and since the Taliban was not recognized as the legitimate
government of the country.” Id. (citing Murphy, supra note 3, at 477.). “Therefore, by
implication, the provisions of the Third Geneva Convention could not apply to the
Taliban members captured and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.” Id.
120

Swanson, supra note 117, 944 (citing White House Press Release, White House,

Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020207-13.html (Feb. 7,
2002).).
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Id., at 944-945 (citing n40. Id. Apparently, the Bush Administration felt that the

Taliban had excluded themselves from POW status because of violations of the rules of
war and its close relationship with al Qaeda. Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 461, 479-80 (2002).).
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in Afghanistan do not qualify as prisoners of war, the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention covering prisoners of war are not applicable to those captured in Afghanistan
and moved to Guantanamo Bay. Thus, the United States can use military commissions to
try those captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay.
III(B)(5). MILITARY COMMISSIONS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED
FROM AFGHANISTAN WHO HAVE VIOLATED THE LAWS OF WAR.

Military commissions, according to the laws and customs of war, have
jurisdiction over any “individuals guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offenses in
violation of the laws of war.”122 The Order authorizes military commissions to prosecute
individuals who have violated the laws of war and other applicable laws.123 The laws and
customs of war, a subset of international law, “is considered ‘a part of the law of the

122

Earley, supra note 87, 91 (citing See Winthrop, supra note 44 at 838.)

123

Orentlicher, supra note 3, 649 (citing Military Order, supra note 9, § 1(e), at 57,833.

“The other laws are presumably the statutes defining crimes against the United States, as
implied by the current definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act.” Id. (citing See
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).). See 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 8, footnote 37.
(“As previously discussed, military commission jurisdiction extends beyond law of war
violations. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 904 (1994) (stating that military commissions may impose
the death penalty for the crime of "aiding the enemy"); 10 U.S.C. 906 (1994) (stating that
military commissions may try the crime of spying during wartime); Military Order, supra
note 6, 1(e) (referring to the application of "other applicable laws by military tribunals");
see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 257.).
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land’ under the Constitution”124 and “are derived from many sources including customary
international law, international treaties and agreements, scholarly treatises, and judicial
decisions.”125 The laws of war are “subject to varying interpretations constantly
adjusting to address new technology and the changing nature of war.”126 One example of
the laws of war adapting to the changing nature of war is that undeclared wars fall within
the laws of war, “in recognition of the reality that formal declarations of war may be
largely a thing of the past.”127 The laws of war “consist of general principles of conduct
that apply during times of armed conflict” and “is not a formal written code, like the
UCMJ.”128
Attempts have been made to codify those general principles129 - particularly the
United States Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, which codifies
124

Earley, supra note 87, 88 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2nd Cir.

1980) (citation omitted).).
125

Id. (citing Jennifer Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War

Criminals before Military Commissions, CRS Report for Congress No. RL31191, Dec.
11, 2001, at 6.).
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Elsea, supra note 36, 2.

127

Elsea, supra note 2, 5.
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Earley, supra note 87, 88 (citing Winthrop, supra note 44 at 773.).
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See the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration

of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, August 12,

41

the Army’s interpretation of the law of war.130 The UCMJ defines “law of war” as “that
branch of International Law which prescribes the rights and obligations of belligerents ...

1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, August 12, 1949, Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3317
(hereinafter GC III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, August 12, 1949, Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, art. 6, 6 U.S.T. 3516
(hereinafter GC IV).
130

See Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, chapter 1, § 1

(1956) (listing treaties pertinent to land warfare to which the United States is a party);
“The Department of Defense defines the law of war as follows:
3.1. Law of War. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of
armed hostilities. It is often called the law of armed conflict. The law of war
encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the
United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary
international law.
Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.77, December 9, 1998, viewed
November 25, 2001 on the Defense Department web site at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d510077_120998/d510077p.pdf (emphasis
supplied). The law of war is not, however, coextensive with the broader field of
international law or law of nations. For example, money laundering and drug trafficking
are the subject of international treaties but do not relate to the conduct of hostilities.” The
Committee on Military Affairs and Justice, Inter Arma Silent Leges: In Times of Armed
Conflict, Should the Laws be Silent? A Report on the President’s Military Order of
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which, in time of war, define the status … of enemies … and which authorizes their trial
and punishment when offenders.”131 Although Congress was “authorizing the
punishment of violations of the laws and customs of war by way of military commission
in the UCMJ,”132 “Congress was not attempting to “codify [the law of war] or to mark its
precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law
condemns.”133 Correspondingly, the laws of war “must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”134 By not codifying the laws of war,
Congress “‘incorporated by reference, as within the [constitutional] jurisdiction of
military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war.’”135 “By
not codifying the laws of war, as it could have under the Constitution, Congress was
expressing its intent to have military commissions be the ‘courts of appropriate
jurisdiction’ and determine whether a particular act violated the laws of war.”136 The

November 13, 2001, Regarding “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism,” 57 The Record 39, 48, n.34 (2002).
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Earley, supra note 87, 87-88 (citing Winthrop, supra note 44 at 773 (emphasis

added).).
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Id., at 88 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.).
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Id., at 88-89 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.).
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Id., at 88 (citing Id.).
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Id., at 89 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30.).
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laws of war during times of armed conflict supersede the ordinary laws of the land137 “in some situations it may supersede certain provisions of the Constitution itself.138
The law of war requires a party to “avoid needless and disproportionate suffering
and damages” when pursuing a military objective.139 Without oversimplifying the
concept, when assessing the legality of any use of force for political objectives, three
principles derived from the laws of war – military necessity, humanity and chivalry – are
applied to assess the use of such force.140
III(B)(5)(a). MILITARY NECESSITY IN USING FORCE FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.
The principle of military necessity requires that “[t]he use of force must be
proportional in relation to the anticipated military advantage or as a measure of selfdefense.”141 “If the use of force is justified, that use must be proportional in relation to
the anticipated military advantage or as a measure of self-defense.”142 The principle,
however, “does not apply to unlawful acts of war”143 as “[t]here can be no excuse of
necessity if the use of arms is not itself justified.”144
137

Id., at 88 (citing Winthrop, supra note 44 at 773.).

138

Id., at 88 (citing Winthrop, supra note 44 at 773.).
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Elsea, supra note 2, 7 (citing See Documents, supra note 11, at 9.).
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Id. (citing See Documents, supra note 11, at 9.). (summarizing principles found in

military manuals of various nations).
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Id.
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Id., at 2.
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Id., at 7 (citing See Documents, supra note 11, at 10.).

144

Id., at 7.
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III(B)(5)(b). HUMANITY IN USING FORCE FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.
“Lawful combatants are bound to use force discriminately” and “limit their targets
to valid military objectives and must use means no harsher than necessary to achieve their
objective.”145 “They may not use methods designed to inflict needless suffering, and they
may not target civilians.”146
III(B)(5)(c). CHIVALRY IN USING FORCE FOR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.
“Combatants must adhere to the law of armed conflict in order to be treated as
lawful combatants.”147 “They may not conceal their arms and disguise themselves as
non-combatants during battle or preparation for an attack.”148
Military commissions can try those individuals who violate the laws of war in
pursuing either a military or political objective.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, military commission have jurisdiction to try those captured in

Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo as (1) a military commission in Guantanamo
Bay fits within the expanded notion of a theater of war; (2) an armed conflict existed in
Afghanistan, and the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan; (3) those captured
in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay do not qualify as prisoners of war; (4)
military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of war.
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Thus, those captured in Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo Bay can be subject
to a military commission pursuant to The Order. A military commission has jurisdiction
to preside in Guantanamo Bay over those captured in Afghanistan as the President in
ordering those military commissions is acting within his war powers and in accordance
with Congress’ Joint Resolution 23. The President’s powers are at their highest when he
acts with the strength of his own powers and with the authorization of Congress.
Additionally, U.S. courts have also deferred to the President when he is acting within his
powers as commander in chief.
Acting at the peak of his powers, the President issued a Military Order (“The Order”)
with the strength of his own Executive powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the United
States Armed Forces and with the authorization of Congress’ Joint Resolution 23.
Through Joint Resolution 23, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force in the war against terrorism. The language of Joint Resolution 23
confers upon the President a very broad power to wage a global war on terrorism. Along
with his own powers as the Commander-in-Chief, the President’s decision to implement
The Order and subsequently decision to use military commissions at Guantanamo Bay
are within the authority that Congress broadly conferred on the President and are within
his powers as Commander-in-Chief.
In trying those individuals subject to The Order, the Secretary of Defense is to
determine the time and place for military commissions to try those individuals.
Individuals subject to The Order include (1) al-Qaeda members; (2) persons who have
engaged, helped, conspired or taken acts in preparation for international terrorism against
the United States and (3) anyone knowingly harboring someone described in (1) or (2).
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U.S. citizens are not subject to The Order. The Secretary of Defense has also determined
that the military commissions should take place at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
Although Congress’ constitutional power to wage war is the legal basis for
military commissions, the Executive Branch has historically established military
commissions. The President has the authority to convene military commissions to try
offenses against the laws of war. Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice grant military commissions the jurisdiction to try
individuals who violate the law of war. Military commissions can try persons for
violations of the laws of war. Military commissions, unlike courts-martial and Article III
courts, can be held at any geographic location. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized the power of the military to exercise jurisdiction over those charged with
violating the laws of war. U.S. Supreme Court opinions in Ex parte Quirin, Yamashita,
Eisentrager and Kinsella have recognized that military commissions are proper fora for
the trial of violations of the laws of war. These opinions are evidence that the President
has the power to establish military commissions for the trail of violations of the laws of
war.
The theater of war for the global war against terrorism is much broader than just
Afghanistan. The President historically has been able to establish a military commission
in terms of the place in a ‘theater of war’ or a war-related occupied territory. The term of
‘theater of war’, although once formally defined, has evolved over time to meet the
changing nature of the less-defined, modern-day warfare tactics and global wars. As
wars have become more global, the jurisdictional requirement of ‘theater of war’ has
adapted to meet the expanding nature of our modern wars. Most notably, the global
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nature of World War II caused the term ‘theater of war’ to lose much of its relevance in
determining the appropriate placement of military commissions. Courts have either
expanded the notion of the ‘theater of war’ requirement or have refused to define the
boundaries. The courts’ refusals to address the limitations of the ‘theater of war’
requirement displays that the term ‘theater of war’ is a term that must change and adapt to
meet the ever-expanding nature of modern, global warfare.
Just as World War II changed the previous, conceived notions of a theater of war,
the war against terrorism demands a further expansion of the ‘theater of war’
jurisdictional limitation. The war on terrorism is a modern, global war that fits into no
geographical boundaries, and the notion of a ‘theater of war’ must change and expand to
meet the current development and nature of present-day warfare, especially for the war
against terrorism. A military commission pursuant to The Order sitting in Guantanamo
Bay does fit within the expanding notion of ‘theater of war.’
The military commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction over those captured
in Afghanistan because the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. A formal
declaration of war is not needed for the laws of war to apply, since the laws of war come
into play during any armed conflict. The laws of war apply only during times of war, and
a state of war may exist where only one party has made a declaration of war or where
neither party has made a formal declaration. The Supreme Court and Congress have
recognized that a state of war may exist without a formal declaration.
The United States was clearly at war, declared or undeclared, in Afghanistan,
when the United States’ use of military force upgraded the conflict between the Taliban
and the Northern Alliance to an international armed conflict. Thus, the military

48

commission in Guantanamo Bay has jurisdiction over those captured in Afghanistan and
brought to Guantanamo Bay because the laws of war apply to those captured in
Afghanistan.
Whether an individual captured in Afghanistan is considered a prisoner of war or
not determines if that individual is subject to the jurisdiction of a military commission.
Unlawful combatants are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and can be tried
and punished by U.S. military commissions. Unlawful combatants, as opposed to lawful
combatants, fail to qualify for the protections of being prisoners of war. In general,
lawful combatants are open, active participants in hostilities, as soldiers who wear the
uniform, move under a flag, and hold the appropriate commission from their government
and are entitled to all the courtesies due to soldiers. If the detainees are recognized as
prisoners of war, they would be immune from prosecutions for lawful acts of war. If the
detainees are considered prisoners of war, international law requires that the transfers be
subject to transfers are subject to limitations imposed by two treaties to which the United
States is a party, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. Also, the Third Geneva Convention requires that a prisoner of
war be given essentially the same rights that a member of the armed forces of the party
trying him or her would receive under similar circumstances.
In other words, if a detainee is found to be a prisoner of war, then the procedures
required to try him would be those under which an equivalent U.S. serviceman or woman
would be tried. Thus, if the detainee was found to be a prisoner of war and tried before a
military commission, then a military commission must also try the United States’ own
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solders as well. The United States can only implement military commissions to try
prisoners of war only when military commissions are also used to try its own military
personnel. Since U.S. military personnel are not currently tried before military
commissions, if those captured in Afghanistan are considered prisoners of war, the U.S.
could not use military commissions to try those detainees.
The United States has determined that the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention covering prisoners of war are not applicable to those members of the Taliban
and Al Qaeda captured in Afghanistan and then moved to Guantanamo Bay. Since those
captured in Afghanistan do not qualify as prisoners of war, the United States can use
military commissions to try those captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo
Bay.
Military commissions, according to the laws and customs of war, have
jurisdiction over any individuals guilty of illegitimate warfare or other offenses in
violation of the laws of war. The Order authorizes military commissions to prosecute
individuals who have violated the laws of war and other applicable laws. Generally, the
laws of war consist of general principles of conduct that apply during times of armed
conflict and is not a formal written code. The Department of Defense defines the law of
war as that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice defines law of war as that branch of International Law
which prescribes the rights and obligations of belligerents which, in time of war, define
the status of enemies and which authorizes their trial and punishment when offenders. In
defining the law of war in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress was not
attempting to codify the law of war but rather was authorizing the punishment of
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violations of laws of war. In general, the laws of war require a party to avoid needless
and disproportionate suffering and damages when pursuing a military objective. When
assessing the legality of any use of force for political objectives, three principles derived
from the laws of war – military necessity, humanity and chivalry – are applied to assess
the use of such force. Military commissions can try those individuals who violate the
laws of war in pursuing either a military or political objective.
In conclusion, military commission have jurisdiction to try those captured in
Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo as (1) a military commission in Guantanamo
Bay fits within the expanded notion of a theater of war; (2) an armed conflict existed in
Afghanistan, and the laws of war apply to the conflict in Afghanistan; (3) those captured
in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay do not qualify as prisoners of war; (4)
military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the laws of war.
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